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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, District Court No. 064400347 
Appellate No. 20080911 
vs. 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, of the Utah Fourth Judicial District court, in and for 
Utah County, the Honorable Samuel McVey presiding. Jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78A-4-103(2)(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse it discretion in finding that Petitioner was 
cohabitating and terminating Appellee's obligation to pay further alimony? 
Standard of Review: A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material 
change in circumstances has occurred that would warrant reconsidering the divorce 
decree is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1995) (citation omitted) (refusing to find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding common residency and sexual contact (cohabitation), and 
therefore terminating alimony). "Whether cohabitation exists 4is a mixed question of 
fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are 
shown to be clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" 
Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, ^ f 2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional provisions, Statutes and rules are relevant to this 
Appeal. 
Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and (10) (1953 as 
amended): 
4 
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(8)(g)(i) the court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial and material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Rules: 
1. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9): 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellee is satisfied with Appellant's statement of the case, and does not 
wish to supplement that statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are additional or different facts from the record that the trial court could 
have relied on its decision, which are not set forth in Appellee's Statement of Facts. 
These additional or different facts are as follows: 
1. The Appellant was living with her parents at least as early as October 
25, 2006. She reported to the court in a criminal case that she resided 
5 
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with her parents on that date. (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; Tr. at pp. 
76-77; Tr. at p. 116:2-7; Plaintiff s Exhibit l1). 
2. The Appellant was living at her parents' home without paying any rent 
or other expenses. (Tr. at p. 128:9-11; Tr. at p. 144:11-13). 
3. Appellant's parents were not aware of or able to control the sexual 
interactions that were occurring among the residents of their home (Tr. 
at p. 131-132; Tr. at p. 137). 
4. Appellant and Mr. Hart lived in the same house, with Appellant's 
parents, for at least five months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 
17-25; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 116:2-7; Tr. at p. 162:21-25; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ffl[ 5, 6, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1). 
5. Appellant and Mr. Hart both came and went from the house as they 
pleased (Tr. at p. 8; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, f^ 
11,12). 
6. Appellant and Mr. Hart slept in the same room together (Tr. at pp. 103-
104; Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, If 4). 
1
 The trial court has apparently lost all of the exhibits in this case, as none of them are 
part of the record (although they are referred to as having been marked and received 
in R. at 169 and in the trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a 
document prepared by Appellant on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal 
charge against her, in which she represented to the Court that her residence was 867 
North 2600 West, Provo, Utah 84601—the same address as that at which she and Mr. 
Hart cohabitated. 
6 
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Appellant and Mr. Hart received their mail at that same address, 
including Petitioner's alimony payments (Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-
7;Tr. at p. 128:4-8). 
Appellant did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary 
evidence to show that she or Mr. Hart had any other address at which 
either of them resided (Tr. at p. 39:17-22). 
Appellant claimed that she did not have any other permanent address 
except her parents' address, where she and Mr. Hart resided (Tr. at p. 
14:5-10). 
Appellant and Mr. Hart were seen coming and going from the house 
together (Tr. at pp. 8-9). 
Appellant and Mr. Hart had a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115:3-13; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, f^ 10). 
Appellant and Mr. Hart treated each other as boyfriend and girlfriend 
(Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, 14; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum D, t 8). 
Appellant and Mr. Hart were inseparable (Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
C,t7;Tr.atp. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum D, 16). 
7 
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14. Appellant and Mr. Hart spent the night together in Salt Lake City (Tr. at 
p. 112:1-9; Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, ^  9; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, <[j 13). 
15. Appellant's vehicle was at the house on four of five different occasions 
when a private investigator drove by the house (Tr. at p. 9:9-16). 
16. The observations of Appellant's own son led him to believe that 
Appellant and Mr. Hart were having a sexual relationship (Appellant's 
brief, Addendum C, ^ | 3). 
17. Appellant and Mr. Hart interacted and behaved in a way that was 
consistent with a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Appellant's brief, 
Addendum D,^| 7, 10). 
18. Appellant and Mr. Hart attended parties together, sat side by side, and 
acted as though they were girlfriend and boyfriend (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; 
Appellant's brief, Addendum D, <[ 8). 
19. Appellant and Mr. Hart flirted with each other (Appellant's brief, 
Addendum C, Tl 4). 
20. Appellant and Mr. Hart fought with each other at times and acted heart-
broken and love-sick during those fights (Appellant's brief, Addendum 
C,1f5). 
8 
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21. Appellant flew into a jealous rage when she though that Mr. Hart was 
spending time with other girls and she assumed he was cheating on her 
(Tr. at p. 109:9-25; Appellant's brief, Addendum C, | f 6-7). 
22. Appellant admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would 
happen if she and Mr. Hart got caught together (after Petitioner's 
daughter became aware of certain letters between Petitioner and Mr. 
Hart) (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 123-124; Appellant's brief, Addendum 
D,1fl0). 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court correctly terminated Appellee's alimony obligation because 
Appellant was cohabitating. 
The trial court has broad discretion to address issues of alimony; and the 
appellate court should not disturb the trial court's decisions on alimony unless there 
was a clear abuse of discretion. 
There was evidence from which the trial court properly found that Appellant 
and Michael Hart shared a common residence. Appellant failed to marshal the 
evidence of common residency, and failed to establish how the evidence of common 
residency was fatally flawed to such an extent that it could not justify the trial court's 
decision. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There was evidence from which the trial court properly found that Appellant 
and Michael Hart had sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. Appellant 
failed to establish how the evidence of sexual contact was fatally flawed to such an 
extent that it was insufficient to justify the trial court's decision. The circumstantial 
evidence of sexual contact was sufficient to justify the trial court's decision. 
The appellate court should affirm the trial court's decision to terminate 
alimony because there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find 
both common residency and sexual contact. Therefore the trial court's findings were 
within its discretion, and its conclusion from those findings (i.e., that cohabitation 
occurred) was correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION; BUT 
CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAS 
COHABITATING, AND NO LONGER ENTITLED TO ALIMONY. 
"Cohabitation exists when a 'former spouse is residing with a person of the 
opposite sex and engaging in sexual contact with that person.'" Jensen v. Jensen, 
2007 UT App 377, 173 P.3d 223, 225 (quoting Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Ut 
Ct.App. 1995). Once cohabitation is established, alimony is terminated. Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-5 (10) (1953 as amended). 
"Trial courts are given broad discretion to address issues related to alimony." 
Black v. Black 2008 UT App 465, 199 P.3d 371, 374, citing and quoting Despain v. 
10 
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Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Utah 1980) (uIn both the formulation of the 
original decree and any modifications thereof, the trial court is vested with broad 
discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an appellate court only in the 
presence of clear abuse thereof); and Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f 28, 973 
P.2d 431 ("The determination of the trial court that there [has] been a substantial 
change of circumstances [warranting modification of alimony] . . . is presumed valid, 
and we review the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard."). 
Thus, we start the analysis of this case with the presumption that the trial 
correctly determined that Petitioner was cohabitating, and no longer entitled to 
alimony. The court of appeals must uphold the trial court's decision unless the 
Appellant, (1) marshals all record evidence that supports each challenged finding, and 
(2) shows the fatal flaw in that evidence, i.e., explains why the challenged evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, | | 21, 56 
(Footnote 5), quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
11 
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must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous.") 
In the instant case, Appellant has challenged the trial court's finding of 
common residency, but has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding of common residency. She has also failed to demonstrate why the evidence 
that supports the finding is insufficient. 
Appellant has also challenged the trial courts finding of sexual contact. While 
she has attempted to marshal the evidence of sexual contact, she has failed to 
demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's 
finding on this issue. 
A. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER SHARED A 
COMMON RESIDENCE WITH MR. HART. 
Appellant correctly states that Cohabitation requires "the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or 
brief period." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 668, 672 (Utah 1985). In this case, 
common residency was established by the fact that the Petitioner and Mr. Hart lived 
in the same house for at least five months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-
25; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellate's Brief, Addendum D, lfi[ 5, 6), both of them came and 
went from the house as they pleased (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
D, T| 11, 12), slept in the same room together (Tr. at pp. 103-104; Appellant's Brief, 
12 
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Addendum C, ]f 4), received their mail at that same address, including Petitioner's 
alimony payments (Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7), did not provide any rent receipts 
or other documentary evidence to show that they had any other address at which 
either of them resided (Tr. at p. 39:17-22), claimed that they did not have any other 
permanent address (Tr. at p. 14:5-10), were seen coming and going from the house 
together (Tr. at pp. 8-9), had a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum D, ^  10), treated each other as boyfriend and girlfriend (Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum C, ^ 4; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ]f 8), were 
inseparable (Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, 17; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, 16), and continued to see each other and spent the 
night together even after Mr. Hart left the common residence (Tr. at p. 112:1-9; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, f 9; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
D, 113). In addition, Petitioner reported to the court in a criminal matter that she 
resided at the same address where Mr. Hart resided at least as early as October 25, 
2006 (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; Tr. at pp. 76-77; Plaintiffs Exhibit l2), and her 
The trial court has apparently lost all of the exhibits in this case, as none of them are 
part of the record (although they are referred to as having been marked and received 
in R. at 169 and in the trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a 
document prepared by Appellant on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal 
charge against her, in which she represented to the Court that her residence was 867 
North 2600 West, Provo, Utah 84601—the same address as that at which she and Mr. 
Hart cohabitated. 
13 
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vehicle was at the house on four of five different occasions when a private 
investigator conducted surveillance of the house (Tr. at p. 9). 
Appellant does not point out any flaws in the foregoing evidence, and does 
even attempt to explain why such evidence is insufficient to establish common 
residency. Instead, she plucks, from prior case law, isolated indicia of common 
residency used by courts in other cases, and attempts shows that some of those indicia 
are not present here. Her argument seems to be that because the presence or absence 
of a particular circumstance was sufficient to terminate alimony in another case, such 
finding is necessary to terminate alimony in this case. Instead of looking at the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the issue of common residency, Appellate 
points to a few isolated facts. It appears she would have the appellate court weigh the 
evidence and decide that the weight the trial court gave to certain evidence was 
improper. 
Appellant begins her attack on the evidence by pointing out that the parties in 
this case did not share living expenses. But she prefaces her discussion of this issue 
with an admission that the sharing of living expenses is not necessary to terminate 
alimony. Appellant's Brief, p. 9. Appellee agrees that the sharing of living expenses 
is not dispositive. See, e,g., Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah Ct.App. 
1996) (finding that the sharing of living expenses was not necessary to show common 
residency). 
14 
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In the facts of this case, as in Pendleton, such lack of sharing is irrelevant to 
the question of common residency. The undisputed facts of this matter are that both 
Petitioner and Mr. Hart were residing in the home of Petitioner's parents, who paid 
for the living expenses. (See Tr. at p. 15:19-21; Tr. at p. 128:9-11; Tr. at p. 144:11-
13). Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Hart took any financial responsibility for those 
expenses. In short, there were no living expenses for them to share, so that factor 
would not be relevant in this case. 
Appellant then claims she and Mr. Hart did not have access to each other's 
living quarters. That claim is not support by the evidence. It was clear that both Mr. 
Hart and Appellant came and went from the residence as they pleased, and that they 
both had access to each other's living quarters. According to her own testimony, 
Appellant's living quarters were the couch in the basement (Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2, and 
107:1-3). Appellant and Mr. Hart were found sleeping together or near each other on 
or by the couch in the basement. (Tr. at 104:15-17, 107:8-16; R. at 105,f4). Clearly, 
Mr. Hart had access to Appellant's living quarters. 
Finally, Appellant claims that there was no evidence that she and Mr. Hart ate 
together regularly, shared food expenses, or kept clothing or other personal property 
in the same bedroom. She is mistaken; but even if she were correct, such lack of 
evidence would not be sufficient for the appellate court to find that the trial court 
abused it discretion. 
15 
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Once again, Appellant focuses on a few isolated facts, and ignores the other 
evidence upon which common residency was predicated. She fails to show the fatal 
flaw in the evidence that was presented. 
Regarding the food expenses, it is a reasonable assumption from the evidence 
that neither she nor Mr. Hart paid for food, as that was provided by Appellant's 
parents. (See Tr. at p. 15, lines 19-21; Tr. at p. 144:11-13) The Court could also 
reasonably assume from the fact that neither of them maintained another permanent 
residence that the Appellant and Mr. Hart both kept personal property and clothing at 
the residence. The Court could also reasonably find that they probably ate together, 
as there was evidence was that they were inseparable (Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
C, K 7; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, «|[ 6). 
B. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE OF 
COMMON RESIDENCY. 
It is the Appellant's obligation to marshal every scrap of evidence that supports 
the Court's finding of common residency. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, *[fl[ 
21, 56 (Footnote 5), quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
16 
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the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous.") If she fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate 
court is entitled to ignore her argument on that issue, and assume that there was 
sufficient evidence upon which the trial court based its findings. See Heber City 
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) ("When a party fails to . . . marshal 
the evidence in support of [a] finding, we 'assume[] that the record supports the 
fmdingf]....'" (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). In re D.G., 938 P.2d 298, 
301 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (Appellant "must marshall [sic] the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted)). 
In the instant case, Appellant has not made an effort to marshal the evidence in 
support of a finding of common residency. She has attempted to marshal evidence in 
support of the Court's finding of sexual contact, but has completely ignored any 
marshaling regarding common residency. 
Evidence Regarding Common Residency 
To demonstrate the lack of marshaling on the issue of common residency, 
Appellee has made a cursory (though not necessarily comprehensive) effort to list 
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below some of the evidence of common residency that Appellant should have 
marshaled. 
Petitioner and Mr. Hart lived in the same house for at least five months, and 
possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-25; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 116:2-7; 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ^  5, 6). Both came and went from the house as 
they pleased (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ^  11, 12), slept in the 
same room together (Tr. at pp. 103-104; Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, ^  4), 
received their mail at that same address, including Petitioner's alimony payments (Tr. 
at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7), did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary 
evidence that they had any other address at which either of them resided (Tr. at p. 
39:17-22), claimed that they did not have any other permanent address (Tr. at p. 14:5-
10), were seen coming and going from the house together (Tr. at pp. 8-9), had a 
romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ^ f 10), treated 
each other as boyfriend and girlfriend (Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, *f 4; Tr. at p. 
115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ^  8), were inseparable (Appellant's Brief, 
Addendum C, ^  7; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Appellant's Brief, Addendum 
D, Tf 6), and continued to see each, and spent the night together even after Mr. Hart 
left the common residence (Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, ^  9; Tr. 
at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's Brief, Addendum D, ^  13). In addition, Petitioner reported 
to the court in a criminal matter that she resided at the same address where Mr. Hart 
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resided as early as October 25, 2006 (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; Tr. at pp. 76-77; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1), and her vehicle was at the house on four of five different 
occasions when a private investigator drove by the house (Tr. at p. 9). 
Because Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence of common residency, 
her claim of error on this issue should not be considered by the appellate court. 
Instead, the appellate court should assume that the record supports the trial court's 
findings. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) ("When a 
party fails to . . . marshal the evidence in support of [a] finding, we 4assume[] that the 
record supports the finding[]....'" (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). In re 
D.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (Appellant "must marshall [sic] the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence."(alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
FOUND THAT THERE WAS A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
APPELLANT AND MR. HART. 
Appellant suggests that the trial court should be reversed because there was no 
direct evidence of a sexual relationship. Appellant's Brief, p. 43. She does not, 
however, cite any statute or case to support her assertion that direct evidence is 
needed to establish sexual contact. Although she cites several cases where alimony 
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was terminated based upon direct evidence, she never cites a case where the court 
refused to terminate alimony because of a lack of such direct evidence. 
She would have the Court rule that the fatal flaw in the marshaled evidence is 
that she was never caught in flagrante delicto] that no one came forward and testified 
to having seen Appellant and Mr. Hart committing the sexual act. Her argument 
about imposing a requirement to find sexual contact only upon a presentation of direct 
evidence is not well-taken. 
It is a well-established principle of Utah law that circumstantial evidence of an 
event is a sufficient basis for a fact finder to determine that an event occurred, even 
without direct evidence. E.g., State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978) (upholding a 
manslaughter conviction on circumstantial evidence, when there was no direct 
evidence of the defendant's actions, except the defendant's own self-exculpatory 
story). 
If circumstantial evidence is sufficient to justify a finding when "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" is the evidentiary standard, then circumstantial evidence is 
certainly sufficient in this case, where the trial court only had to find sexual contact by 
a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 100 P.2d 207 (Utah 
1940) (implicitly assuming that the evidentiary standard in divorce cases is 
"preponderance of the evidence"). 
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In this case, there was substantial circumstantial evidence demonstrating the 
sexual nature of the relationship. Such evidence includes that Appellant and Mr. Hart 
spent the night together in Salt Lake (Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Appellant's brief, Addendum 
C, 19), that the observations of Appellant's own son led him to believe that Appellant 
and Mr. Hart were having a sexual relationship (Appellant's brief, Addendum C, f 3), 
that they slept in the same room together (Appellant's brief, Addendum C, f 4); that 
their relationship was romantic in nature (Tr. at p. 115; Appellant's brief, Addendum 
D, 13), that they were inseparable (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Appellant's 
brief, Addendum D, f6), that they interacted and behaved in a way that was 
consistent with a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Appellant's brief, Addendum D, 
117, 10), that they attend parties together and sat side by side and acted as though 
they were girlfriend and boyfriend (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Appellant's brief, Addendum D, 
Tf 8), that they flirted with each other (Appellant's brief, Addendum C, ^ f 4), that they 
fought with each other at times and acted heart-broken and love-sick during those 
fights (Appellant's brief, Addendum C, ^  5), that Appellant flew into a jealous rage 
when she thought that Mr. Hart was spending time with other girls, and she assumed 
he was cheating on her (Tr. at p. 109:9-25; Appellant's brief, Addendum C, 116-7); 
that Appellant admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would happen if 
she and Mr. Hart were caught together (after the daughter discovered letters between 
Appellant and Mr. Hart) (Tr. at p. 123-124; Appellant's brief, Addendum C, f 10). 
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In short, there was ample evidence presented at trial from which the court 
could find sexual contact between Appellant and Mr. Hart. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appelle respectfully submits that the trial court's 
decision to terminate alimony should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of , 2009. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
GUY L. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellee 
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